Mesh Security

  This page is monitored by the OLPC team.

Mesh Security Analysis

Introduction

The purpose of the mesh subsystem is to transfer data between mesh points over a partially connected mesh network. This analysis attempts to categorize the threats that would prevent the mesh subsystem from performing this duty.

It is important to keep in mind that mesh networks, due to the lack of underlying infrastructure and the use of a shared medium, are inherently insecure. For instance, there is no possible defense against disruptions of the physical medium with jammers and similar equipment. In the analysis below we focus on the measures that need to be adopted to prevent attacks performed by the xo's themselves, as such attacks would be the easiest to execute.

The mesh subsystem in OLPC does not provide mechanisms to control access to the network nor to ensure confidentiality. Thus this analysis does not cover mitigations to common network attacks such as eavesdropping or unauthorized network access. It is assumed that those services will have to be provided by higher network layers.

The threat categorization that follows is based on [1] and [2].

Attacks on Flow of Data Traffic

Resource Depletion

Traffic flooding (saturate the medium)

As mentioned in the introduction little can be done against this.

Mitigation: TODO: Can the xo be used to flood the medium and use up all the channel capacity?

Directed traffic flooding (fill up victim's queues)

Mitigation: TODO

Flow Disruption

Node impersonation (MAC address spoofing)

Nothing prevents assigning a different MAC address to the wireless interface. This address will be used until the laptop is rebooted. An attacker can impersonate a victim and prevent her from receiving traffic.

Mitigation: The destination sequence number could be used to detect that there are duplicate MAC addresses within range.

Data tampering by forwarding nodes.

Forwarding nodes could modify data frames so that the frame is considered invalid and dropped at destination.

Mitigation: Forwarding is done at firmware level and users have no access to it. The host cannot modify forwarded traffic.

Nodes behave normally during route discovery but drop data traffic.

Mitigation: Forwarding is done at firmware level and users have no access to it. The host cannot modify forwarded traffic.

Attacks on Flow of Routing Traffic

Modifying the metric in route requests/route replies.

This is perfectly possible using the iwpriv fwt_* interface into the forwarding table.

Mitigation: Disable iwpriv fwt_* commands before release?

Invalidating the route table in other nodes by advertising incorrect paths.

Same as previous.

Refusing to participate in the route discovery process.

Mitigation: A mesh point cannot leech the mesh: in order to send and receive traffic it must also propagate data and route management frames for other nodes.

Generate false route error messages

Route error messages propagate information about invalid routes. False route error messages could cause the deletion of valid routes, which would have to be rediscovered.

Mitigation: Route error messages are generated by the firmware and cannot be forged from the host.

Bibliography

[1] "Techniques for Intrusion-Resistant Ad Hoc Routing Algorithms (TIARA)", Ramanujan R. et al., MILCOM 2000. 21st Century Military Communications Conference Proceedings, 2000

[2] "Intrusion Detection in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks", Mishra A., Nadkarni K. and Patcha A. IEEE Wireless Communications, February 2004

--Jcardona 15:16, 2 April 2007 (EDT)

More thoughts on Mesh Security

Mesh security is required

1. To prevent unauthorized access to data transmitted between peer nodes.
2. To prevent rogue nodes from disrupting mesh discovery
3. By flooding the network with mesh packets

The mesh security protocol should ensure

1. Authenticated access to the mesh
2. Protect content through encryption

Access to the mesh can be

1. Open access

In open access any mesh node is allowed to participate in node discovery. This allows greater connectivity between mesh nodes. However intermediate rouge MPs can provide false information on Path Metric, thereby preventing proper route discovery. This is therefore not acceptable.

1. Authenticated Access only

Mesh nodes involved in forwarding should be authenticated with a common shared secret. This ensures that rouge MPs can’t subvert mesh discovery. However it reduces the connectivity of the mesh as other MPs not part of the same group cannot assist in mesh discovery.

1. Multiple Authenticated access

In this scenario mesh nodes can have multiple shared secrets. Therefore each mesh node can based on the mesh SSID or other information, use a different shared secret to join the mesh. The MP can be part of multiple mesh and can forward packets from one mesh to the other.

--rchokshi 15:43, 10 April 2007 (PDT)